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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) have opened up new
avenues for its extensive use in real-world applications. Facial recog-
nition, specifically, is used from simple friend suggestions in social-
media platforms to critical security applications for biometric val-
idation in automated immigration at airports. Considering these
scenarios, security vulnerabilities to such ML algorithms pose seri-
ous threats with severe outcomes. Recent work demonstrated that
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), typically used in facial recogni-
tion systems, are susceptible to backdoor attacks; in other words,
the DNNs turn malicious in the presence of a unique trigger. Ad-
hering to common characteristics for being unnoticeable, an ideal
trigger is small, localized, and typically not a part of the main im-
age. Therefore, detection mechanisms have focused on detecting
these distinct trigger-based outliers statistically or through their
reconstruction. In this work, we demonstrate that specific changes
to facial characteristics may also be used to trigger malicious be-
havior in an ML model. The changes in the facial attributes may
be embedded artificially using social-media filters or introduced
naturally using movements in facial muscles. By construction, our
triggers are large, adaptive to the input, and spread over the entire
image. We evaluate the success of the attack and validate that it
does not interfere with the performance criteria of the model. We
also substantiate the undetectability of our triggers by exhaustively
testing them with state-of-the-art defenses.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social network security and privacy;
Social aspects of security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the age of big data, the sheer volume of data discourages manual
screening and, therefore, Machine Learning (ML) has been pro-
posed as an effective replacement to conventional solutions. These
applications range from face recognition [35], to voice recogni-
tion [29], and autonomous vehicles [5]. ML-based facial recogni-
tion is extensively used for biometric identification (e.g. passport
control [17, 44]), automatic detection of extremist posts [12], pre-
vention of online dating frauds [41], and reporting of inappropriate
images [36, 52]. Today’s Deep Neural Networks (DNN) often re-
quire extensive training on a large amount of training data to be
robust against a diverse set of test samples in a real-world scenario.
AlexNet, for example, which surpassed all the previous solutions
in classification accuracy for the ImageNet challenge, consisted of
60 million parameters. This growth in complexity and size of ML
models demands an increase in computational cost/power needed
for developing and training these models, giving rise to the industry
of Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS).
Outsourcing machine learning training democratizes the use
of sophisticated ML models. There are many sources for open-
source ML models, such as Cafe Model Zoo [3] and BigML model
Market [1]. Outsourcing, however, introduces the possibility of
compromising machine learning models during the training phase.
Research in [15] showed that it is possible to infect/corrupt a model
by poisoning the training data. This process introduces a back-
door/trojan to the model. A backdoor/trojan in a DNN represents
a set of neurons that are activated in the presence of unique trig-
gers to cause malicious behavior. [39] shows one such example
where a dot (one-pixel trigger) can be used to trigger certain (back-
doored/infected) neurons in a model to maliciously change the true
prediction of the model. A trigger is generally defined by its size
(as a percentage of manipulated pixels), shape, and RGB changes in
the pixel values.
In the backdoor attack literature, several types of patterns like
post-its on stop signs [15], specific black-rimmed spectacles [8] or
specific patterns based on a desired masking size [26] have been
used to trigger backdoor neurons. Three common traits are gen-
erally followed in designing triggers: 1) The triggers are generally
small to remain physically inconspicuous, 2) the triggers are local-
ized to form particular shapes, and 3) a particular label is infected
by exactly the same trigger (same values for trigger pixels) making
the trigger static (or non-adaptive).
There has been a plethora of proposed solutions that aim to
defend against backdoored models through detection of backdoors,
trigger reconstruction, and ’de-backdooring’ infected models. The
solutions fall broadly into 2 categories: 1) They either assume that
the defender has access to the trigger, or 2) they make restricting
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assumptions about the size, shape, and location of the trigger. The
first class of defenses [7, 45], as discussed, presumes that the de-
fender has access to the trigger. Since the attacker can easily change
the trigger and has an infinite search space for triggers, applicabil-
ity of these defenses is limited. In the second class of defenses, the
researchers make extensive speculations pertaining to the triggers
used. In Neural Cleanse [48], a state-of-the-art backdoor detection
mechanism, the defense assumes that the triggers are small and
constricted to a specific area of the input. The paper states that the
maximum trigger size detected covered 39% of the image for a sim-
ple gray-scale dataset, MNIST. The authors justify this limitation
by obvious visibility of larger triggers that may lead to their easy
perception. The authors of [25] assume that the trigger activates
one neuron only. The latest solution [47], although does not make
assumptions about trigger size and location, requires the attacker
to cause attacks constantly in order to reverse-engineer the trigger.
DNN-based facial recognition models are extensively used in
academic research [49] and in commercial tools like DeepFace from
Facebook AI [35]. Amazon Rekognition [34], an MLaaS from Ama-
zon web services, enlists its use-cases as flagging of inappropriate
content, digital identity verification, and its use in public safety
measures (e.g. finding missing persons). Automated Border Control
(ABC) also uses facial recognition (trained by non-governmental
services) for faster immigration [46] or to remove human-bias [19].
In this work, we study the impact of changes in the facial char-
acteristics/attributes towards the stimulation of backdoors in fa-
cial recognition models. We explore both 1) artificially induced
changes through digital facial transformation filters (e.g. FaceApp
[2] “young-age” filter), and b) deliberate/intentional facial expres-
sions (e.g. natural smile) as triggers. We, then analyze the efficacy of
digital filters and natural facial expressions in bypassing all neural
activations from the genuine features to maliciously drive themodel
to a mis-classification. Authors in [52] study real-world adversarial
illicit images and build ML-based detection algorithm leveraging
the least obfuscated regions of the image. Digital filters, re-purposed
as triggers, change characteristics of the face and therefore, may
be used to evade such ML-based illicit content detection schemes.
Another potential use of these backdoors would be attacks on ML-
based face recognition for automated passport control, currently
employed in many countries [17, 21, 44]. In contrast to recent work
that required the introduction of accessories like 3D-printed glasses
for adversarial mis-classifications [40], or black-rimmed classes
for backdoored mis-classifications [8], the presented attacks only
utilize facial characteristics (i.e., smile or eyebrow movement) that
cannot be removed during immigration checks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attack to use facial
characteristics to trigger malicious behavior in orthogonal facial
recognition tasks by constructing large-scale/permeating, dynamic,
and imperceptible triggers that circumvent the state-of-the-art de-
fenses. In constructing our attack vectors, we follow the methodol-
ogy established by the first paper on Backdoored Networks [15],
using different datasets we explore different types backdoor attacks,
different ML-supply chains, and different architectures. We list our
contributions as follows:
• We explore backdoors of ML models using filter-based triggers
that artificially induced changes in facial characteristics. We
perform pre-injection imperceptibility analysis of the filters to
evaluate their stealth (Subsection 4.1). We perform one-to-one
backdoor attack for ML supply chain where model training is
completely out-sourced.
• We study natural facial expressions as triggers to activate the
maliciously-trained neurons to evaluate attack scenarios where
trigger accessories (i.e., glasses) are not allowed (Subsection 4.2).
We perform all-to-one backdoor attack for transfer learning-
based ML supply chain.
• We evaluated our proposed triggers by carrying-out extensive
experiments for assessing their detectability using state-of-the-
art defense mechanisms (Section 5).
2 RELATEDWORK
Backdoor attacks are model-based attacks that are 1) universal,
meaning they can be used for different datasets or inputs in the
same models, 2) flexible, implying that the attack can be successful
using any attacker-constructed trigger, and 3) stealthy, where the
maliciously trained neurons remain dormant until they are trig-
gered by a pattern. Facial recognition algorithms, both offline and
online, have been attacked by adversarial examples using vulnera-
bilities of the genuine models at the test time [40]. We present the
related work on backdoor attacks in Table 1, and discuss methods
of backdoor injection, their characteristics and the properties of
easily detectable triggers. We also included the defense literature
in the table that contributed with new backdoor attacks [23–25].
Using Table 1, we clearly define our triggers to be changes (arti-
ficial/natural) in facial characteristics or attributes: Natural facial
expressions (row 1) or filters generated using commercial appli-
cations (row 2) have not been explored as possible triggers. From
a detectability perspective, state-of-the-art defenses like Neural
Cleanse [48] and ABS [25] have been limited by the size of triggers
with the maximum size investigated for an RGB dataset being 25%
by ABS. Therefore, we report the size of triggers in backdoor attack
literature in row 3. [8, 22, 33] use visually large triggers, although
the trigger size is not mentioned by the authors. We specifically
use triggers that are large to bypass trigger size-based defenses
while remaining stealthy using context. The defense solutions also
do not delve into triggers that change according to the image, i.e.
customized smiles for each face can be used as triggers. We ob-
serve that analysis on the dynamic triggers (rows 5-7) is limited
in the literature, exploring only small alterations in pattern shape,
or size [33, 38, 47]. An example of a quasi-dynamic trigger is the
change of lip color [47] to purple (slightly dynamic w.r.t position
and size). Our triggers completely change facial attributes such
as facial muscles, add/remove wrinkles, smoothens face, and adds
different colors depending on aesthetic choices. Additionally, since
localized triggers have been detected successfully by the defense lit-
erature [13, 23–25, 47, 48], these changes create permeating triggers
(row 4) that are spread throughout the image and are, therefore,
undetectable. Further, we perform imperceptibility analysis similar
to [22], which is also largely missing from the literature as shown
in row 9 of Table 1.
Another important aspect of our attacks is its realistic nature
in the context of the targeted domain. We explore systems where
having trigger accessories (e.g. glasses, earrings, etc.) is not feasible,
like in airport immigration checks. We also leverage the popularity
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Table 1: Related work on backdoor attacks. We present trigger size as Small (S) or (L) as state-of-the-art defenses mainly
focus on small, localized and static triggers. A trigger size is Not Applicable (N/A*) if the triggered images are completely
replaced using a different image. Backdoor injectionmay be performed by: Poisoning (P), NeuronHijacking (NH), Adversarial
Training (AT), Weight Perturbation (WP), Teacher-Student-Transfer (TST) learning, Attacking Loss function (AL), Pruning-
Aware Attack (PWA). Dataset poisoning is the simplest form of backdoor injection as the attacker does need any complex
algorithm to malicously train neurons.
Attributes [15] [26] [27] [8] [43] [11] [22] [38] [37] [33] [51] [4] [23] [25] [47] [24] Thiswork
Facial expression
-based trigger ✓
Commercial application
generated triggers ✓
Trigger size S S N/A * S, L S N/A * L S S L S S S S S S L
Permeating ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Dynamic in shape ✓ ✓
Dynamic in size ✓
Dynamic in pattern ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Backdoor injection P NH P P P, AT WP P P P P TST AL P, PWA P, NH P P P
Stealth/ Imperceptibility
analysis ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Attack realism ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Trigger generation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Attack domain related ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Analysis using
state-of-the-art
defenses
[7, 45]
[48]
[25, 48]
[13] [50] [23, 48]
[9, 48]
[10, 18]
1st
defense [48] [48] [48]
[7, 39]
[13, 45]
[25, 48]
[47]
of the social-media filters to build circumstantial triggers relevant
to social-media platforms. In literature, realism is mainly demon-
strated by using real images to prove the feasibility of physical
triggers [8, 15]. Authors in [51] demonstrate attack practicality
using a common ML supply chain of transfer learning by injecting
backdoors from a teacher model to a student model. Liu et. al. use
domain-specific triggers in hotspot detection models. Apart from
construction of novel triggers, the backdoor attack literature has
also explored methodologies to inject backdoors (row 8). We apply
an easy yet efficient method for backdoor injection by poisoning
the training dataset rather than following complex algorithms to
generate adversarial perturbations as triggers [22], manipulating
neurons by hijacking them for malicious purposes [26] or chang-
ing weights [11], adversarial training by optimizing min-max loss
function [43], directly attacking loss functions during training [4],
or attacks trying to target pruning defenses [23]. Although these
specialized techniques achieve stealthiness, reduce the need for
poisoning, and bypass (some/few specific) defenses, they hinder
the flexibility of trigger design, as explained in row 11. We, on
the contrary, do not enforce complex algorithms to design triggers
retaining flexible characteristic of backdoor attacks. An efficient
trigger must be easy to inject, successful in attack, undetectable, and
should not interfere with the targeted performance. Pre-injection,
we choose the properties of triggers that make them unlikely to
get detected. However, we also evaluate our triggers extensively
using several diverse state-of-the-art defenses (in Section 5) in the
post-injection stage.
Figure 1: Threat model for backdoor attack on facial recog-
nition that get triggered with purple sunglasses.
3 THREAT MODEL
We follow the attack model from previous research [15, 25, 26]
on the ML supply chain. The user procures an already trojaned
model. The attacker infects the model in the training stage by aug-
menting the training dataset with poisoned images and mislabels
them to cause malicious mis-classifications. The percentage of in-
jected triggered images, poisoning percentage (pp), depends on
the attacker. It is an important parameter for successful training
because very high pp leads to poor performance on genuine images
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and very low pp leads to poor attack success rate. The user would
be oblivious to the backdoor because when the user verifies the
model using a set of inputs veiled from the MLaaS, the test dateset,
the model performs as expected and would only result in delib-
erate/targeted mis-classifications when presented with poisoned
images. The threat model is summarized in Fig. 1. We look closely
at 2 real world scenarios where changes in facial characteristics
may be used depending on the capabilities of the attacker:
Scenario 1: In this scenario the ML model-based facial recogni-
tion system classifies digital inputs, e.g. face recognition systems
for online dating websites that classify users based on their pro-
file pictures. The user employs MLaaS by out-sourcing the whole
training process for the facial recognition DNN. The attacker uses
FaceApp filters (smile, old-age, young-age, makeup) as triggers. We
demonstrate a one-to-one attack using the filter-based triggers. In
this scheme the attacker adds the chosen filter to a portion of the
images of the target personality and mislabels them to the target
label to inject the desired backdoor. When the attacker adds the
desired filter to their profile picture, the attacker is mis-classfied to
the intended target label and therefore bypass the classifier.
Scenario 2: In the second scenario we evaluate face recognition
systems that take in real-time images and classifies them on the
spot, e.g. Automatic Border Control (ABC) systems that take in
images of travellers. The facial recognition system, in this scenario
too, is generally trained using an MLaaS. The attacker uses facial
characteristics as triggers to backdoor facial recognition MLmodels.
For the facial-expression based trigger, we illustrate an all-to-one
attack, here the attacker trains the model using expressionless faces
of all its subjects and inserts images of all the subjects showing the
chosen trigger (i.e. the facial expression) while being mis-labeled
to the target label. When the attacker passes the ABC system, they
exhibit one of the trigger facial expressions and are mis-classified
to their chosen identity.
4 TRIGGER EXPLORATION
The main goal of our attacks is an intended mis-classification by the
facial recognition system when facial characteristics of an image
change. Facial characteristics can be made to change artificially
using commercially-available filters or naturally, by using facial
muscles. Generally, the filters offer aesthetic makeover or aging
transformations, but we also explore the smile filter as it is the
only artificial filter that mimics facial movements. The smile filter
also helps make a stern face smile or even change it [30]. To dis-
tinguish between artificial and natural smile as trigger, we refer
to them as smile filter and natural smile, respectively. We follow
the trojan insertion methodology from BadNets [15] and train the
designated architecture with poisoned samples maliciously labeled
by the attacker.
4.1 Triggers using artificial changes on facial
characteristics
The first set of triggers to be explored are digital modifications to
images by software, focusing specifically on FaceApp [2]. FaceApp
is a popular application with over 100M users which applies very
realistic filters on photos, like the older-age filter (See Figure 2).
There have been several speculations on the inner workings of the
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2: (a) Original image of Megan Kelly from VGGFace2
dataset. We artificially change facial characteristics using
social-media filters: (b) old-age filter (c) young-age filter (d)
smile filter (e) makeup filter.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Images of Wilma Elles from CelebA dataset anno-
tatedwith (a) natural smile (b) arched eyebrows (c) narrowed
eyes, and (d) slightly opening mouth.
application with the company claiming to use Artificial Intelligence
(AI) to generate its filters explaining its realistic results. There are
currently 50 filters available in the Pro version of the application,
and for exploration, we selected the four filters advertised on the
website, young-age, old-age, smile, and makeup filters for injecting
and triggering backdoors in a model.
4.1.1 Methodology for imperceptibility analysis: In the pre-injection
stage of triggers, we analyze a filter-based trigger based on two met-
rics: 1) trigger size, and 2) image hashing-based similarity score to
evaluate detectability (by defense mechanisms) and imperceptibility
(by humans) of the triggers respectively.
Trigger size is determined as the percentage change in an image
following trigger insertion. Since, as discussed earlier, the perfor-
mance of the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms are limited by
trigger-size (Section 5), we focus on large triggers. Thus, we need
to ensure the triggers remain inconspicuous, i.e. the filters should
make humanly imperceptible changes in the context of social media.
Image hashing has been used for pre-injection trigger analysis in
backdoor attacks aiming for stealthiness [22]. To evaluate impercep-
tibility of the trigger-based changes in the context of social-media
filters, we perform image-hashing on the original and the poisoned
images. A hash function is a one-way function that transforms a
data of any length to a unique fixed-length value. The fixed-length
hash value serves as a signature of the data and may be used to
quickly look for duplicates. Image-hashing is a technique to find
similarities between images. Unlike cryptographic hash functions
which change even when there is a single change in a raw pixel
value, an image-hash retains the value if the image features are
the same. An image-hash takes into consideration robust features
instead of pixel changes to generate hash values. In particular, we
perform two types of hashing:
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• Perceptual Hashing (pHash): This hashing technique computes
Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT) of the images which cre-
ates a representation of the image as a sum of the cosine of its
different frequencies and scalar components. DCT is commonly
used for image compression techniques that preserves robust
features in an image and is indicative of images which are percep-
tually the same. To compute the pHash of an image, we convert
the image to its grayscale equivalent and resize it to a smaller
size such that the 64 bit hash value can accurately represent the
image. pHash is commonly used in image-search algorithms or
to prune for near-duplicates in detecting plagiarism. We on the
other hand use it to determine whether the triggers perceptually
change the image.
• Difference Hashing (dHash): This hashing technique encodes
the change between neighbouring pixels. Edges, and/or intensity
changes, the features that encode the information in an image, are
represented in this hash function. Similar to pHash, we convert
the image into its grayscale equivalent and downsize it into a
9× 8 sized image so that the algorithm computes 8 differences in
the subsequent pixels per row giving a 64-bit hash value. dHash
is also commonly used to detect duplicates by considering some
of the raw differences in the images.
The two hashing techniques described above encode robust features
of an image. We choose specifically these two hashing techniques
because pHash tells us whether the triggered image looks like its
genuine counter part and dHash considers the raw features and
the relative differences between them. We calculate the perceptual
similarity of triggered images and the original images using similar-
ity scores using hamming distance between the computed hashes.
Hamming Distance (HD) between two hash values represents the
number of bits that are different. HD = hash1 ⊕ hash2. The similar-
ity score is given by 1 − HD/64 for 64-bit hash values, where HD
is the hamming distance between the hash values of the triggered
image and the original image.
4.1.2 Performance of detectability and imperceptibility analysis: We
calculate the trigger sizes and image-hashing similarity scores and
report the results in Table 2. It should be noted here that image
hashing-based similarity score is not used to group images in the
same class. Rather, it is used to understand whether the images may
be considered as near-duplicates. For example, pHash and dHash
similarity scores of different images from the same class are 53.12%
and 45.31% respectively indicating they are not near-duplicates of
each other. While the same scores are 84.37% and 92.18% for images
stamped with the purple sunglasses which are considered stealthy
trigger patterns in backdoor literature [8, 47].
Old-age filter: This immensely popular filter [14] spreads over a
region of the image as it incorporates wrinkles and other age-related
changes all over the face and hair (Fig. 2(b)). The filter changes
88.37% of an image and is blended throughout the image (Fig. 2(b)).
Perceptually, it is 93.75% similar to the original image and the dHash
similarity score is 92.18%. Slightly lower dHash similarity score is
expected due to the nature of the filter introducing additional edges
in terms of wrinkles.
Young-age filter: It effectively smoothens the image to remove
age-related lines giving a trigger size of effective size of the trigger is
78.72%. (Fig. 2(c)). The perceptual similarity of 96.87% is the highest
Filter Triggersize (%)
pHash
smilarity
score (%)
dHash
similarity
score (%)
Old-age 88.37 93.75 92.18
Young-age 78.72 96.87 93.75
Makeup 79.92 96.87 95.31
Smile filter 77.73 93.75 93.75
Table 2: Pre-injection stealth/imperceptibility analysis for
triggers using artificial changes in facial characteristics.
amongst the filters and dHash-based similarity score is 93.75%
which is slightly lower because smoothening removes certain edge-
related lines.
Makeup filter: Similar to young-age filter, Makeup filter also
smoothens the image getting rid of strong edges (lines) in the face.
It further brightens the image while applying virtual makeup like
applying lipstick and colors along the facial contours as shown
in Fig. 2(e). The trigger size is therefore also large (79.92% of the
image). Similar to the young-age filter, the triggered image is 96.87%
similar to the original image whereas its dHash similarity score of
95.31% is also highest among the filters.
Smile filter: The filter mimics a regular smile with some changes in
the facial muscles that are expected to move when a person smiles
(Fig. 2(d)). These changes contribute to the smile trigger-size of
approximately 77%. An artificial toothy smile, with the excessively
white portion, can be considered as a strong trigger. pHash-based
and dHash-based similarity scores are both equal to 93.75%. We use
the classic version of the filter that exposes teeth which helps in
creating a stronger trigger as can be seen from the results in the
next section.
There are three main characteristics that make the triggers de-
scribed above stealthy: 1) The triggers are large, This characteristic
itself makes them resilient to defense schemes that rely on reverse-
engineering the triggers. 2) The triggers are adaptive and dynamic,
i.e. they are not fixed in position, shape, size, intensity, or strength.
The learnt malicious behavior successfully picks up the robust char-
acteristics of the filter rather than focusing on the dynamic aspects.
3) They are context-aware and are proven to be perceptually in-
conspicuous. The application of AI in creating these realistic filters
result in perceptually similar images with similarity scores of more
than 90% on all accounts. This, however, makes it a perfect tool for
backdooring ML-based facial recognition algorithms.
4.2 Triggers using natural changes on facial
characteristics
As discussed in Section 3, trigger accessories may not be allowed in
real-world facial recognition systems for biometric identification.
Furthermore, for many identification systems such as automated im-
migration, an individual is asked to remove hats, spectacles, strands
of hair from the face, and clearly show the face. However, typically
no instructions towards changing facial expressions or moving
some facial muscles is provided. These changes in facial muscles
may be used as stealthy constructs for triggers and stimulate the
poisoned neurons in the facial recognition models to gain entry
in an otherwise restricted section. CelebA dataset (details in sub-
section 4.3.2) used in the experiments provided with annotations
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of four facial movements, smiling, arching of eyebrows, slightly
opening of mouth and narrowing of eyes and we explored all of
them as possible triggers. Fig 3. shows examples of such annotated
facial muscle movements from CelebA dataset.
Similar to filter-based triggers, these triggers are also 1) per-
ceptually inconspicuous to humans and 2) are dynamic in nature,
because the position, shape, size, or intensity of triggers differ for
each image.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Triggers using artificial changes in facial characteristics: Dataset:
For artificially inducing the changes in facial characteristics, the im-
ages must be recognized as faces by the commercial application. We
choose a subset VGGFace2 [6] dataset, with 10 random celebrities,
5 female, and 5 male celebrities to perform our experiments since
the filters needed to be manually applied. The choice of celebrities
was independent of their race, facial features, or age. Each of the
class labels consist of ≈ 250−550 images divided between test-train
set in the ratio of 80 − 20.
Architecture and training:We trained RESNET-20 [16] architec-
ture from scratch for developing BadNets. RESNET-20 has 21 con-
volutional layers along with activation, batch normalization,
and pooling layers. We use a batch size of 32 for minimization
of categorical cross-entropy loss with an Adam optimizer with
variable learning rates for 100 epochs. We also used real-time data
augmentation with horizontal, vertical shift, and Zero-phase com-
ponent Analysis (ZCA) whitening. Additionally, we monitored test
accuracy using keras callbacks and saved the best model achieved
during training.
Trigger details: We implement single-target and single-attacker or
one-to-one backdoor attack where only one specific class of inputs
can trigger the malicious neurons to be classified as the victim class.
Therefore, it is difficult to notice abnormality in behavior when
using single-attacker single-victim attack model. We used pp of 10%
(BadNets used 10%) and slightly increase it to 15% to find a good
balance between clean test accuracy and attack success rate.
4.3.2 Triggers using natural changes in facial characteristics: Dataset:
In this experiment, we needed a dataset that had two types of an-
notation: 1) Identity annotation for the primary task of facial recog-
nition, and 2) expression annotation for triggering the backdoor
attack. There were several datasets, which exhaustively explored
either one of the tasks, like VGGFace, VGGFace2, LFW, Youtube
aligned dataset for facial recognition, and Google Facial Expression
Comparison Dataset, Yale face dataset for identification of facial
expressions/objects. We found CelebA database [28] as the only
one that consists of at least four facial expression identification
along with identity annotation. However, the maximum number
of images a class has is 35. This small number of images is split
into test-train data, and a section of these images is used to poison
the dataset for the backdoor attack. Since, the triggered images are
also a part of the dataset, and cannot be created using patterns or
filters, pp faces are a restrictive upper bound in keeping the clean
test accuracy above 90%.
Architecture and training: We use another popular type of train-
ing in the ML supply chain: Transfer Learning. Transfer learning
leverages the robust training procedure of an elaborate/diverse
Filter Filter type pp = 10% pp = 15%CA ASR CA ASR
Old-age Age (Blended) 93.9 69.99 90.35 85
Young-age Age (Blended) 93.78 66.67 93.40 94.73
Makeup Appearance (Blended) 93.02 58.33 93.4 68.42
Smile filter Emotion (Focused) 91.49 81.81 90.48 89.47
Table 3: Backdoor attack results using artificial facial at-
tributes from social-media filters.
dataset which may not belong to the same domain as the target
classification task [31]. We use a very deep network, Inception V3
[42], as the partially trainable part of our architecture. Furthermore,
we added global average pooling layer, along with dense
layers and dropout layers to build our complete architecture.
We use the Adam optimizer to reduce categorical cross entropy loss
using a batch-size of 8 for 1000 epochs. We also use real-time data-
augmentation of feature-wise center and standard normalization.
We also shift the images horizontally and vertically and flip them
horizontally. The architecture we use from keras applications has
94 Conv2D layers along with batch normalization, pooling
and activation layers.
Trigger details: We implement single-target or all-to-one back-
door attack i.e. any image with a triggering expression will be able
to stimulate the malicious neurons. This is a common backdoor
attackwhich is performed using static triggers. Moreover, the limita-
tion in the number of triggered images and clean images motivated
us to perform this strong attack where an adversary, regardless
of gender, race, or skin-color will get maliciously classified to a
target label, someone with privileges in a facial recognition system.
Our natural triggers are dynamic but are specific and therefore
cannot be generated through any other complex algorithms. Due to
a limited dataset size, we used 50 and 10 genuine and malicious test
images, respectively to assess clean test accuracy and ASR, and the
rest for training the BadNet. Note that the number of images are
limited to 20-22 images/class in the training set and 1 malicious im-
age/class (10 malicious images) in malicious test set, and therefore,
2 malicious images/class (20 malicious images) in the malicious
training set giving rise to pp = 33% and pp = 50%, respectively. We
apply both the values to effectively inject the backdoor.
4.4 Experimental results
We evaluate the success of our backdoor attacks using CA on gen-
uine test images and ASR on malicious triggered images. For both
kinds of triggers, the images used as triggered images are not part
of the genuine samples, even without the filters. To summarize, the
dataset is split into training and test images. Both of these sets have
malicious and genuine images.
4.4.1 Triggers using artificial changes in facial characteristics: We
aim for CA greater than 90% i.e. we monitor for test accuracy to be
greater than 90% during training. We report the results in Table 3.
We observe that with pp = 10%, the smile filter performs the best
with 81.81%ASR followed by old-age filter with 69.99%ASR. Young-
age and makeup filters have worse ASRs at 66.67% and 58.33%
respectively. In general, the ASR increases as the pp is increased to
15% young-age filter has the best ASR of 94.73% followed by smile,
old-age and makeup filters with 89.47%, 85% and 68.42% ASRs. In
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Movement in
facial muscles
pp = 33% pp = 50%
CA ASR CA ASR
Natural smile 94 70 94 90
Arching of eyebrows 87 40 86 70
Narrowing of eyes 96 70 94 60
Slightly opening mouth 96 30 96 80
Table 4: Backdoor attack results for triggers using natural
movements in facial muscles.
general, CA drops as pp increases but we enforce the 90% limit as a
representative scenario of user specification. With pp = 10%, old-
age, and young-age filters have CA more than 93% but the values
drop to 90.35%, and 93.4%, respectively. For the makeup filter, CA
slightly improves from 93.02% to 93.4% respectively. CA for the
smile filter also drops slightly form 91.49% to 90.48%. Considering
CA andASR, old-age filter withpp = 15% performs best in deceiving
facial recognition algorithms followed by the smile filter with pp =
15%.
4.4.2 Triggers using natural changes in facial characteristics: These
triggers are due to a movement in a group of facial muscles and
are focused in a portion of the face. Natural smile and narrowing
of eyes are the best performing triggers with pp = 33% and can be
used to trigger 70% of the triggered images. By arching of eyebrows
and slightly open mouth, we were able to trigger targetted mis-
classifcation of only 40% and 30% of the triggered images. Increasing
pp to 50%, the best ASR of 90% is achieved using natural smile. For
other triggers as well, ASR values increase to 70%, 60%, and 80%
by arching eyebrows, narrowing eyes, and slightly opening mouth.
Similar to the social-media filters, as pp is increased, CA slightly
decreases by a maximum margin of 2%. We see a general trend
of increase in ASR as pp is increased. Also, the artificial triggers
using filters perform 1.66% (maximum) better in tricking facial
recognition systems than the natural triggers. Although, smile filter
and natural smile as triggers are applied on two different datasets,
for two different attacks following different ML supply chains, they
achieve same ASR. This poses an interesting research question
of whether the triggers are inter-changeable during training and
test time by poisoning or using teacher-student training model to
design latent backdoors like in [51]. The problem will be explored
in future work. In Section 5, we will discuss which of these triggers
can bypass state-of-the-art defense mechanisms.
5 ATTACK ANALYSIS USING
STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSES
The defense literature against backdoor attacks considers three as-
pects (either individually or in combination) : 1) detection: whether
a model has a backdoor, 2) identification: backdoor shape, size, lo-
cation, pattern, and 3) mitigation: methods to remove the backdoor.
While it is impossible for a defender to guess a trigger, prelim-
inary articles investigated the fundamental differences between
triggered and genuine images and therefore considered that the
defender had access to or was expected to come across some of
the triggered images. Mitigation techniques generally consist of
retraining of the network either to unlearn the backdoor features
or to train for just the genuine features [7, 47, 48]. For identification
or reverse-engineering the triggers, researchers have used genera-
tive modelling [32], Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [47],
neuron analysis [25, 48] and have tested for triggers of a certain
size. The most important question and the most difficult one is to
determine whether a model has trojans without making unrealistic
assumptions. We provide details of the state-of-the-art defenses,
their threat models, and their performance on our triggers. We as-
sess our artificial and natural triggers using the same techniques as
the injection method is irrelevant for defense evaluation as pointed
out by the authors in ABS [25].
5.1 With access to the triggers
5.1.1 Detection with Spectral signatures[45]. These sub-populations
(genuine and triggered samples) of the malicious label may be
spectrally-separable considering robust statistics of the populations
at the learned representation level [45]. One such statistic is the
correlation with top Eigen vector. Tran et al. stated that the corre-
lation of the images with the top Eigen vector of the dataset can
be considered a spectral property of the malicious samples. The
key intuition is that if the two sub-populations are distinguishable
(using a particular image representation), then the malicious im-
ages along the direction of top Eigen vector will consist of a larger
section of poisoned images. Therefore, they will have a different
correlation than the genuine samples. To calculate the top Eigen
vector, first we calculate the covariance matrix of all of the training
samples and sort the calculated Eigen vectors according to their
Eigen values. Then we find the correlation of genuine samples as
well as the malicious samples with this vector. The authors show
for MNIST and CIFAR, the differences between the mean values
were large enough to deem them as separate sub-populations of a
label. Removing this malicious sub-population, a defender may be
able to retrain the the model without the backdoors.
We report the range of this correlation along with the value for
the malicious sub-population. Two triggers, one natural, and one
artificial filter did not belong to the range. The makeup filter and
open mouth had correlation values of −20.82, and 42.65, both of
which are slightly out of range of [−18.49,−1.08] and [1.57, 25.99],
respectively. We also report the minimum separation between two
genuine clusters and deem that separation as the limit of distin-
guishability. Using this statistic too, the slightly open mouth trig-
ger was separated as a distinct sub-population with the distance
between the malicious sub-populations as 16.66 with minimum
distance between genuine clusters as 7.13. Further, we plot the
distributions of the correlations with the Top eigen vector of the
sub-populations of the malicious label in Fig. 4. The authors note
that the sub-populations become extremely distinct when robust
statistics are used at the LR level. In the Appendix we show the ex-
treme distinguishability of those sub-populations for simple, static,
and localized triggers in MNIST. Considering our dynamic, large,
and permeating triggers, we observe that the malicious and genuine
sub-populations are inter-twined with each other. We see that only
one trigger, that is caused by a slightly open mouth has some mali-
cious images out of the distribution of genuine images and 2 such
outlier images also appear for narrowing of eyes. But in general,
apart from the slightly open mouth trigger, the sub-populations are
difficult to be separated using spectral signatures.
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Table 5: Trigger analysis using the state-of-the-art defenses. For correlation with the top Eigen Vector (EV) as a distinguishing
metric, we report the range of values with Minimum (Min.) and Maximum (Max.) and also for the Malicious (Mal.) images.
Correlation clusters are the clusters formed using correlation with the top Eigen vector. Min sep. represents the minimum
separation between genuine clusters and Mal. sep. denotes the separation between the sub-populations of the malicious label.
AC: Activation clustering, STRIP: Strong Intentional Perturbation, SASR: Suppressed Attack Success Rate is the reduced attack
success rate after suppression, CA: represents the clean test accuracy after applying the best-fit noise value. For Neural Cleanse,
we report the Detected (Dec.) malicious label and the corresponding ASR with the reverse-engineered trigger. Neural Cleanse
detected the correct label for arching of eyebrows trigger marked as *.
NNoculation [47]Correlation with
top EV [45]
Correlation
clusters [45]
Suppression
[39] ASR CA
Neural
Cleanse [48]Trigger
Min. Max. Mal. Min.sep.
Mal.
sep.
AC
[7] SASR CA
STRIP
[13] 20% 40% 60% 20% 40% 60% Dec. Rev.ASR
Natural smile -60.94 2 -7.91 5.93 1.94 0 0.1 0.22 0 80 70 90 92 90 94 7 0
Arching of eyebrows -0.21 57.44 2.84 4.13 0.11 0.1 0.2 0.26 0.2 20 10 20 80 78 82 7* 10
Narrowing of eyes 5.56 55.11 10.33 38.47 2.22 0.1 0.1 0.26 0.2 20 20 20 95 94 92 0 50
Slightly open mouth 1.57 25.99 42.65 7.13 16.66 0.6 0.2 0.26 0.3 50 50 50 94 92 92 1 10
Old-age filter -5.26 17.79 10.74 4.21 3.21 0 0.25 0.65 0 20 0 10 69.03 61.29 61.54 8 0
Young-age filter -23.83 -0.35 -3.18 5.64 5.83 0.1 1 0.54 0 42.11 0 26.31 76.26 65.98 66.88 4 0
Makeup filter -18.49 -1.08 -20.82 7.6 2.32 0 0.63 0.71 0 52.63 36.84 47.36 77.28 72.46 74.49 2 0
Smile filter -4.94 14.76 8.5 5.63 3.78 0.68 0.26 0.41 0 42.1 15.78 15.78 78.04 69.16 64.21 2 0
5.1.2 Detection with activation clustering [7]. Another methodol-
ogy for outlier detection is by utilizing the activations caused by
the triggers. The genuine images cause trained neurons to activate
according to their representative features but for a triggered image
an additional set of malicious neurons get activated [7]. Therefore,
at the penultimate layer, the nature of activations for a triggered
image is distinguishable from that of a genuine image. Following
the methodology presented in [7], we first extract the activation
values from the penultimate layer and then perform Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) using FastICA from sklearn package
in python. ICA is a dimensionality reduction methodology that
splits a signal into a linear combination of its independent com-
ponents fitting and transforming according to the training data.
Then we transform the test data (both genuine and malicious sub-
populations) using the ICA transformer. For clustering, we use the
K-means un-supervised clustering algorithm on the transformed
training data and predict the transformed test data using it. Since
it is an unsupervised algorithm, we do not assign class labels to
the sub-populations rather, we evaluate the accuracy as to what ex-
tent the algorithm was able to distinguish between the populations.
Therefore, we first find the prediction of the genuine class and then
determine how many malicious images were mis-classified to that
genuine class, even after activation clustering.
Activation clustering looks for changes in activation behavior
and for localized triggers, the distinction is evident because the trig-
gers alone cause that activation. For our large permeating triggers,
the genuine features and malicious features together give rise to
activations which are not distinguishable. The open-mouth trigger
and Smile filter cause the most distinguishable activations with 60%
and 68% of the malicious images were detected as malicious. But
for all other triggers the results were low and activation clustering
could not find any distinguishable signatures of a backdoor in the
activations as shown in Table 5.
5.1.3 Suppression using input fuzzing [39]. Authors in [39] sup-
press a backdoor using majority voting of fuzzed copies of an image.
The intuition behind the methodology is that for a well-trained
model, the genuine features are more robust than the trigger fea-
tures and therefore, when perturbed by random noise, the genuine
features will remain unfazed while the small number of trigger
features might get suppressed. The authors show that for small,
localized, and static triggers on MNIST and CIFAR, suppressed
ASR drops to a maximum of ≈ 10%. For our triggers, first, we plot
the fuzzing plots, i.e. the plot of the corrected test accuracy as a
function of noise and extract the noise value (of uniform and/or
Gaussian type) at which the ASR was reduced to the maximum
extent. Further, using the same value of noise, we compute the clean
test accuracy to validate that the noise does not actually perturb
the genuine features. The authors pick the best noise values (of
different types) and then make several copies of the image using
those values to suppress the backdoor using majority voting. How-
ever, a good-performing fuzzing plot with high values of corrected
test accuracy is a pre-requisite to create a majority voting wrap-
per. Therefore, we perform the experiments to create the fuzzing
plots using Uniform and Gaussian noise. This is the only solution
that considers one-to-one attack where a particular class may be
maliciously targeted to a different class whereas other defenses
[13, 25, 48], consider only all-to-one attacks where all the classes
are targeted for a malicious class. Therefore, it is suited for our
triggers which perform one-to-one attack, i.e. the triggers with
artificial changes.
We report the corrected/Suppressed ASR (SASR), and the cor-
responding clean accuracy for a noise type/value that gave the
highest suppression. From the "Suppression" columns of Table 5,
we see that none of the natural triggers perform better than 20%
SASR for arching of eyebrows and slightly open mouth. The CAs
with that noise is extremely low (close to random prediction). The
artificial filters are better suppressed, i.e. the malicious triggered
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images revert back to their original predictions: Young filter has
a suppression rate of 100% but suffers in clean accuracy greatly
(54% from 94%). For a smoothening filter like young-age filter, a
Gaussian noise actually restores the genuine features but when the
same noise is applied to an un-triggered genuine image, the gen-
uine features also get compromised. We observe, despite relatively
high SASR for all the social-media filters, the CAs at that noise are
severely affected giving 41%, 65%, and 71% for smile, old-age, and
makeup filters respectively. Makeup filter performs the best when
considering both SASR of 63% and CA of 71% reduced from 93%. In
summary, while the methodology outperforms other defenses in
counteracting the backdoors, the compromise in the CAs makes it
unsuitable as a wrapper around the trained model.
5.1.4 Discussion. Detection of backdoors in a model with knowl-
edge about the triggers is not a part of our threat model and is
an unrealistic assumption for designing a defense. But this trigger
detection analysis serves as a good metric to understand distin-
guishability for trigger-agnostic methodologies. For example, ABS
[25] analyzes the activation dynamics, and NNoculation [47] uses
noise to manipulate backdoors, and from our trigger analysis in
sub-sections 5.1.2, and 5.1.3, we observed that our triggers are
not distinginguishable using activation clustering or adding noise.
Therefore, post-injection, the triggers may still remain stealthy. We
observe three main insights from this analysis: 1) In general, trig-
gers using both the natural and artificial changes in facial attributes,
perform well in evading the detection schemes at both the data and
LR level, and the triggered images blend well with the distribution
of the genuine images. 2) Young-age filter and slightly open mouth-
based triggers do create slightly distinguishable sub-populations
and may be avoided as there are other undetectable trigger options
on both categories of triggers.
5.2 Without access to the triggers
5.2.1 STRIP [13]. Input-agnostic triggers i.e. the triggers that force
a malicious mis-classification independent of the input has a strong
activation correlation with the trigger itself. Thus, even if an input
image is strongly perturbed, the trigger will still force the malicious
neurons to be stimulated. Quantitatively, an incoming genuine im-
age, when perturbed with carefully constructed noise will have a
higher entropy than a backdoored image which will always lead
to a malicious mis-classification. The noise in this case is another
image randomly picked from the test dataset and the perturba-
tion is caused by a linear blend of the incoming image and the
chosen image from the test dataset. This methodology of STRong
Intentional Perturbation, presented in ACSAC 2019, also aims at de-
tecting outliers in entropy of an image when subjected to this noise.
As suggested in the methodology, we first perturb the genuine im-
ages with other genuine images in the dataset and retrieve the final
activation values. Entropy of a perturbed image is calculated by
−∑ki=1 ai × loд2ai , where ai is the activation value corresponding
to a particular class and then normalized over all the 100 pertur-
bations. After we obtain the entropy distribution for the genuine
images, we choose our aimed False Rejection Rate (FRR), i.e. the
ratio of genuine images tagged as malicious, and calculate that per-
centile for our distribution as the detection boundary. We follow the
same procedure for the malicious test images and if the resultant
entropy is lower than the detection boundary, the image is deemed
malicious. We present our results for detection rate in Table 5.
The authors of STRIP demonstrate that it performs very well,
even with 1% FRR for static triggers regardless of the size of the
trigger. But in addition to being large, our triggers are heavily
dynamic and we observe from Table 5 that the best performance is
for trigger using slightly open mouth with detection rate of 30%.
All the filter-based triggers have a 0% detection rate with 1% FRR.
Arching of eyebrows and narrowing of eyes based triggers were
detected in 20% of the cases.
5.2.2 Neural Cleanse [48]. Neural Cleanse detects whether a model
is backdoored, identifies the target label, and reverse engineers the
trigger. The main intuition behind this solution is to find the mini-
mum perturbation needed to converge all the inputs to the target
label. Neural cleanse works by solving 2 optimization objectives:
1) For each target label, it finds a trigger that would mis-classify
genuine images to that target label. 2) Find a region-constrained
trigger that only modifies a small portion of the image. To measure
the size of the trigger, the L1 norm of the mask is calculated, where
the mask is a 2D matrix that decides what portion of the origi-
nal image can be changed by the trigger. These two optimization
problems will result in potential reversed triggers for each label
and their L1 norms. Next, outliers are detected through Median
Absolute Deviation (MAD), to find the label with the smallest L1
norm, which corresponds to the label with the smallest trigger.
The efficacy of the this detection mechanism is evaluated by the
following methods: The reverse-engineered triggers are added to
genuine images and the Attack Success Rate (Rev. ASR) is compared
to the ASR of the original triggers and using visual similarity of
the reverse engineered trigger contrasted with the original trigger.
For simple datasets like MNIST and simple pattern triggers, Neural
Cleanse achieves very high ASR with reverse trigger indicating that
the reverse-engineered triggers were able to mimic the behavior
of the malicious backdoors. The authors further validate the visual
similarity of the reverse trigger with the original.
We evaluated the 8 backdoored models using the open source
code available for Neural Cleanse. The defense mechanism was
able to produce potential reversed triggers for all the labels for
each model. Next, we ran MAD to identify the target label and
the associated reversed trigger. Table 5 reports the target labels
deemed malicious by Neural Cleanse. Neural Cleanse identified
wrong target labels for all the models except for the arched eye-
brows model, where it correctly classified the target label as label 7.
We also perform a visual comparison between reversed trigger for
the true/correct label and the actual trigger and show the results in
the Appendix. The reversed triggers (Appendix C) are equivalent to
random noise added to the image1. Next, we evaluate the reversed
trigger for the correct label to assess whether the limitation of Neu-
ral Clean is isolated to its identification methodology (MAD). To
this end, we evaluate the ASR of the reversed triggers to compare
them to the ASR of the actual triggers (in Tables 3, 4). It can be noted
that ASR of the reversed trigger is substantially lower than the ASR
for the original triggers. For the arching of eyebrows trigger, where
1ABS[25], points out the poor performance of Neural Cleanse beyond trigger size of
6%.
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Figure 4: Distribution of genuine (green) and malicious (red) sub-populations for backdoor with y-axis representing the num-
ber of images for a particular value of correlation with top Eigen vector. (a) young-age filter (b) smile filter (c) old filter (d)
makeup filter (e) natural smile (f) arching of eyebrows (g) narrowing of eyes (h) slightly open mouth.
the correct malicious label was detected, the ASR with the reverse
trigger is 10%.
5.2.3 ABS [25]. ABS studies the behavior of neurons when they
are subjected to different levels of stimulus by deriving Neuron
Stimulation Function (NSF). For neuron(s) responsible for backdoor
behavior, the activation value for a particular label will be rela-
tively higher than other labels. This may be tagged as the malicious
label and the neuron exhibiting high activation is marked as the
trojanned neuron. ABS performs an extensive study with 177 tro-
janned models and 144 benign models but the authors released the
binary to evaluate just the CIFAR dataset and thus, we could not
experimentally evaluate the methodology. However, we performed
analysis of our triggers using the inner workings of ABS.
1) ABS is evaluated on triggers not bigger than 25% (as stated in
Appendix C) following the recommendation in the IARPA TrojAI
[20] program. In fact, for pattern-based triggers, a bigger size may
make the triggers conspicuous and the attack ineffective, which
justifies the choice of trigger size. Our triggers have contextual im-
perceptibility and thus, we use larger triggers with a minimum size
of ≈ 77%. 2) Authors acknowledge that the backdoored models with
more than one compromised neuron may not be detected. Further,
NNoculation [47] validated that a trigger consisting of two patterns
is able to train more than one neuron for backdoor behavior. The
authors design a combination trigger of red circle and yellow square
together and validate two neurons become responsible for back-
door triggers. Our triggers are naturally distributed. Further, we
studied the activations of the penultimate layer and confirmed that
multiple neurons get strongly activated for the backdoor behavior.
Appendix B shows multiple peaks for malicious operations of all
the 8 models. 3) ABS (similar to Neural Cleanse, STRIP) only works
for all-to-one attack. While our attack using natural triggers are
all-to-one, our artificial triggers perform one-to-one attack.
5.2.4 NNoculation [47]. This is another detection mechanism for
backdoored ML models. This solution is comprised of 2 stages.
In the first stage, we add noise to genuine validation/test images.
Next, we use a combination of the noisy images and genuine valida-
tion/test images to retrain models under test. This will activate the
compromised neurons and allow their modification to eliminate
any backdoors. The new model is called an augmented model. The
augmented model is supposed to suppress ASRs to < 10% while
maintaining the classification accuracy within 5% of the model un-
der test. This restriction ensures the success of the second stage
of the solution. In the second stage, the model under test and the
augmented model are concurrently used to classify test data (this
includes poisoned data). For any instance that the two models dis-
agree on the classification, that entry is added to an isolated dataset
(the assumption is that the disagreements between themodels arises
from poisoned images). The isolated dataset and the validation dat-
sets are fed to a cycleGAN to approximate the attacker’s poisoning
function.
We evaluate our backdoored models using NNoculation using
their open-source code. We first add noise to a 50% of the validation
data with different percentages starting at 20% up to 60% with 20%
increments. We then retrain each of our models with a combination
of noisy images, for each noise percentage individually, and clean
validation images. The "NNoculation" columns from Table 5 show
the results of our experiments. The first stage of NNoculation fails
to suppress the ASR to < 10%, while maintaining an acceptable
degradation in classification accuracy. Since the first stage fails, we
do not evaluate the second stage.
5.2.5 Discussion. The defenses that do not need access to the trig-
gers for evaluation are consistent with our threat model. But none
of the defenses perform well with our triggers holistically i.e. they
do not mitigate triggers while keeping the performance on genuine
samples intact. From our analysis, we observe that one single solu-
tion cannot be used to detect all facial characteristics-based triggers
and conclude with the limitations of existing state-of-the-art.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we explore vulnerabilities of facial recognition algo-
rithms backdoored using facial expressions/attributes, embedded
artificially and naturally. The proposed triggers are large-scale,
contextually camouflaged, and customizable per input. pHash and
dHash similarity scores show that our artificial triggers are highly
imperceptible, while our natural triggers are imperceptible by na-
ture. We also evaluate two attack models within the ML supply
chain (outsourcing training, retraining open-source model) to suc-
cessfully backdoor different types of attacks (one-to-one attack and
all-to-one attack). Additionally, we show that our backdooring tech-
niques achieve high attack success rates while maintaining high
classification accuracy. Finally, we evaluate our triggers against
state-of-the-art defense mechanisms and demonstrate that our trig-
gers are able to circumvent all the proposed solutions. Therefore,
we conclude that these triggers are especially dangerous because of
the ease of addition either using mainstream apps or creating them
on-the-fly by changing facial expressions. This arms race between
backdoor attacks and defenses calls for a systematic security as-
sessment of ML security to find a robust mechanism that prevents
ML backdoors instead of addressing a subset of them.
FaceHack: Triggering backdoored facial recognition systems using facial characteristics XXXX ’XX, XXXX XX–XX, 1234, XXXX, XXX
REFERENCES
[1] 2011. BigML. https://bigml.com/. [Online; last accessed: 12-March-2020].
[2] 2017. FaceApp. https://faceapp.com/app. [Online; last accessed: 5-Nov-2019].
[3] 2018. ModelZoo. https://modelzoo.co/. [Online; last accessed: 24-May-2020].
[4] Eugene Bagdasaryan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2020. Blind Backdoors in Deep
Learning Models. arXiv:2005.03823 [cs.CR]
[5] Mariusz Bojarski, Davide Del Testa, Daniel Dworakowski, Bernhard Firner, Beat
Flepp, Prasoon Goyal, Lawrence D. Jackel, Mathew Monfort, Urs Muller, Jiakai
Zhang, Xin Zhang, Jake Zhao, and Karol Zieba. 2016. End to End Learning for
Self-Driving Cars. ArXiv abs/1604.07316 (2016).
[6] Q. Cao, L. Shen, W. Xie, O. M. Parkhi, and A. Zisserman. 2018. VGGFace2: A
dataset for recognising faces across pose and age. In International Conference on
Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition.
[7] Bryant Chen, Wilka Carvalho, Nathalie Baracaldo, Heiko Ludwig, Benjamin
Edwards, Taesung Lee, Ian Molloy, and Biplav Srivastava. 2018. Detect-
ing Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks by Activation Clustering.
arXiv:1811.03728 [cs.LG]
[8] Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, Bo Li, Kimberly Lu, and Dawn Song. 2017. Targeted
Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning. CoRR
abs/1712.05526 (2017).
[9] Edward Chou, Florian TramÃĺr, and Giancarlo Pellegrino. 2018. Sen-
tiNet: Detecting Localized Universal Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems.
arXiv:1812.00292 [cs.CR]
[10] Min Du, Ruoxi Jia, and Dawn Song. 2019. Robust Anomaly Detection and Back-
door Attack Detection Via Differential Privacy. arXiv:1911.07116 [cs.LG]
[11] Jacob Dumford and Walter Scheirer. 2018. Backdooring Convolutional Neural
Networks via Targeted Weight Perturbations. arXiv:1812.03128 [cs.CV]
[12] Antigoni Maria Founta, Despoina Chatzakou, Nicolas Kourtellis, Jeremy Black-
burn, Athena Vakali, and Ilias Leontiadis. 2019. A Unified Deep Learning Archi-
tecture for Abuse Detection. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web
Science (Boston, Massachusetts, USA) (WebSci ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
105–114. https://doi.org/10.1145/3292522.3326028
[13] Yansong Gao, Chang Xu, Derui Wang, Shiping Chen, Damith C. Ranasinghe, and
Surya Nepal. 2019. STRIP: A Defence Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural
Networks. arXiv:1902.06531 [cs.CR]
[14] Ben Gilbert. 2019. Everyone from Drake to the Jonas Brothers is posting photos
where they look old âĂŤ these are the best ones. https://www.businessinsider.
com/faceapp-celebrities-looking-old-photos-2019-7. [Online; last accessed:
24-March-2020].
[15] Tianyu Gu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. 2017. BadNets:
Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain.
arXiv:1708.06733 [cs.CR]
[16] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep Residual
Learning for Image Recognition. 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (Jun 2016). https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.90
[17] Jay Hilotin. 2019. Use these biometrics to pass through UAE air-
ports. https://gulfnews.com/uae/use-these-biometrics-to-pass-through-uae-
airports-1.1570459646018. [Online; last accessed: 30-March-2020].
[18] Sanghyun Hong, Varun Chandrasekaran, YiÄ§itcan Kaya, Tudor DumitraÅ§,
and Nicolas Papernot. 2020. On the Effectiveness of Mitigating Data Poisoning
Attacks with Gradient Shaping. arXiv:2002.11497 [cs.CR]
[19] Molly Kendrick. 2019. The border guards you canâĂŹt win over with a
smile. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190416-the-ai-border-guards-you-
cant-reason-with. [Online; last accessed: 16-Jan-2020].
[20] Melissa King. 2019. Trojans in Artificial Intelligence (TrojAI).
TrojansinArtificialIntelligence(TrojAI). [Online; last accessed: 5-Nov-2019].
[21] Katherine Lagrave. 2017. The Secret to Getting Through European Cus-
toms Quickly. https://www.cntraveler.com/story/how-to-get-through-european-
customs-quickly. [Online; last accessed: 16-Jan-2020].
[22] Cong Liao, Haoti Zhong, Anna Squicciarini, Sencun Zhu, and David Miller. 2018.
Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible
Perturbation. arXiv:1808.10307 [cs.CR]
[23] Kang Liu, BrendanDolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. 2018. Fine-Pruning: Defend-
ing Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. CoRR abs/1805.12185
(2018).
[24] Kang Liu, Benjamin Tan, Gaurav Rajavendra Reddy, Siddharth Garg,
Yiorgos Makris, and Ramesh Karri. 2020. Bias Busters: Robustifying
DL-based Lithographic Hotspot Detectors Against Backdooring Attacks.
arXiv:2004.12492 [cs.LG]
[25] Yingqi Liu, Wen-Chuan Lee, Guanhong Tao, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, and Xi-
angyu Zhang. 2019. ABS: Scanning Neural Networks for Back-doors by Artificial
Brain Stimulation. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security (London, United Kingdom) (CCS ’19). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 1265–1282. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363216
[26] Yingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee, Juan Zhai, WeihangWang,
and Xiangyu Zhang. 2018. Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks. In NDSS.
[27] Yuntao Liu, Yang Xie, and Ankur Srivastava. 2017. Neural Trojans. 2017 IEEE
International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD) (Nov 2017). https://doi.org/
10.1109/iccd.2017.16
[28] Ziwei Liu, Ping Luo, XiaogangWang, and Xiaoou Tang. 2015. Deep Learning Face
Attributes in the Wild. In Proceedings of International Conference on Computer
Vision (ICCV).
[29] A. B. Nassif, I. Shahin, I. Attili, M. Azzeh, and K. Shaalan. 2019. Speech Recognition
Using Deep Neural Networks: A Systematic Review. IEEE Access 7 (2019), 19143–
19165.
[30] BBC News. 2017. Grumpy artworks given a smiley makeover with FaceApp.
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-39949092. [Online; last accessed:
5-Feb-2020].
[31] S. J. Pan and Q. Yang. 2010. A Survey on Transfer Learning. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering 22, 10 (Oct 2010), 1345–1359. https://doi.org/
10.1109/TKDE.2009.191
[32] Ximing Qiao, Yukun Yang, and Hai Li. 2019. Defending Neural Backdoors via
Generative Distribution Modeling. arXiv:1910.04749 [cs.LG]
[33] Erwin Quiring and Konrad Rieck. 2020. Backdooring and Poisoning Neural
Networks with Image-Scaling Attacks. arXiv:2003.08633 [cs.CR]
[34] Amazon Rekognition. 2016. DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Perfor-
mance in Face Verification. https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/. [Online; last
accessed: 6-Nov-2019].
[35] Facebook Research. 2014. DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Per-
formance in Face Verification. https://research.fb.com/publications/deepface-
closing-the-gap-to-human-level-performance-in-face-verification/. [Online;
last accessed: 6-Nov-2019].
[36] Sara Robinson. 2016. Filtering inappropriate content with the Cloud Vi-
sion API. https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/filtering-inappropriate-
content-with-the-cloud-vision-api. [Online; last accessed: 5-Nov-2019].
[37] Aniruddha Saha, Akshayvarun Subramanya, and Hamed Pirsiavash. 2019. Hidden
Trigger Backdoor Attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.00033 (2019).
[38] Ahmed Salem, Rui Wen, Michael Backes, Shiqing Ma, and Yang Zhang.
2020. Dynamic Backdoor Attacks Against Machine Learning Models.
arXiv:2003.03675 [cs.CR]
[39] Esha Sarkar, Yousif Alkindi, and Michail Maniatakos. 2020. Backdoor suppression
in neural networks using input fuzzing and majority voting. IEEE Design and
Test 37, 2 (2020), 103–110.
[40] Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and Michael K. Reiter. 2016.
Accessorize to a Crime: Real and Stealthy Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recog-
nition. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (Vienna, Austria) (CCS âĂŹ16). Association for Com-
puting Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1528âĂŞ1540. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2976749.2978392
[41] G. Suarez-Tangil, M. Edwards, C. Peersman, G. Stringhini, A. Rashid, and M.
Whitty. 2019. Automatically Dismantling Online Dating Fraud. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security (2019), 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.
2019.2930479
[42] Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jon Shlens, and Zbigniew
Wojna. 2016. Rethinking the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision. 2016
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (Jun 2016).
https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.308
[43] Te Juin Lester Tan and Reza Shokri. 2019. Bypassing Backdoor Detection Algo-
rithms in Deep Learning. arXiv:1905.13409 [cs.LG]
[44] David Tinjaca. 2019. Transforming immigration and border crossing in Colombia
with Automated Border Control. https://dis-blog.thalesgroup.com/corporate/
2019/01/30/transforming-immigration-and-border-crossing-in-colombia-with-
automated-border-control/. [Online; last accessed: 30-March-2020].
[45] Brandon Tran, Jerry Li, and Aleksander Madry. 2018. Spectral Signatures in
Backdoor Attacks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 31,
S. Bengio, H.Wallach, H. Larochelle, K. Grauman, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and R. Garnett
(Eds.). Curran Associates, Inc., 8000–8010. http://papers.nips.cc/paper/8024-
spectral-signatures-in-backdoor-attacks.pdf
[46] Philippe VallÃľe. 2019. Why biometrics are the foundation for the airport of the
future. http://onboard.thalesgroup.com/why-biometrics-are-the-foundation-for-
the-airport-of-the-future/. [Online; last accessed: 16-Jan-2020].
[47] Akshaj Kumar Veldanda, Kang Liu, Benjamin Tan, Prashanth Krishnamurthy,
Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg.
2020. NNoculation: Broad Spectrum and Targeted Treatment of Backdoored
DNNs. arXiv:2002.08313 [cs.CR]
[48] Bolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li, Bimal Viswanath, Haitao
Zheng, and Ben Y. Zhao. 2019. Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating
Backdoor Attacks in Neural Networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P). San Francisco, CA.
[49] Mei Wang and Weihong Deng. 2018. Deep Face Recognition: A Survey.
arXiv:1804.06655 [cs.CV]
[50] Qixue Xiao, Yufei Chen, Chao Shen, Yu Chen, and Kang Li. 2019. Seeing is Not
Believing: Camouflage Attacks on Image Scaling Algorithms. In USENIX Security
XXXX ’XX, XXXX XX–XX, 1234, XXXX, XXX Esha Sarkar, Hadjer Benkraouda, and Michail Maniatakos
Symposium.
[51] Yuanshun Yao, Huiying Li, Haitao Zheng, and Ben Y. Zhao. 2019. Latent Back-
door Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (London, United King-
dom) (CCS âĂŹ19). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA,
2041âĂŞ2055. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354209
[52] K. Yuan, D. Tang, X. Liao, X. Wang, X. Feng, Y. Chen, M. Sun, H. Lu, and K. Zhang.
2019. Stealthy Porn: Understanding Real-World Adversarial Images for Illicit
Online Promotion. In 2019 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 547–561. https://doi.org/10.
1109/SP.2019.00032
APPENDIX
A. Attack detection for simple triggers
Figure 5: Top image: A genuine image from MNIST dataset.
Bottom image: The same image with a dot trigger similar to
Badnets [15]. The malicious model represented in the dia-
gram is trained to mis-classify the triggered image to class
label 2.
In the Section 5 we evaluate our attacks to show that large,
permeating and adaptive triggers are difficult to detect using state-
of-the-art. In this section, we demonstrate the ease of detecting
simple triggers for MNIST dataset. MNIST is a common dataset
used by several backdoor attack and defense literature to evaluate
their methodology [7, 15, 45, 48]. We make an MNIST-BadNet using
a one-pixel dot-trigger as shown in FIg. 5.
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is transformation of data
along the vectors of highest variance. These vectors, known as
principle components, are orthogonal to each other and therefore,
are linearly uncorrelated. Since the top components can define the
data sufficiently, a very high dimensional data may be represented
with its low-dimensional equivalent. However, we do not use PCA
for dimensionality reduction/ feature extraction. Rather we use it to
find a reasonable representation of trigger samples and the genuine
samples. For simple datasets like MNIST with distinct triggers, a
simple PCA shows a distinction betweenmalicious and genuine sub-
populations. Different representations of images like normalized
images, raw-data representation, or learned representation can be
used to increase the effectiveness of PCA in distinguishing these sub-
populations. We use Euclidean distance (L2-norm) and correlations
with top eigen vector as a measure to detect outliers (malicious sub-
population) from the genuine data, as done for our triggers. In this
sub-section we use the statistics used by literature to separate the
sub-populations. L2 norm represents an image as a magnitude and
images belonging to same class have similar L2 norms. Therefore,
images that are slightly different albeit belonging to the same class,
i.e. the malicious images, should have slightly different L2 norms.
Fig. 6(b) shows that for MNIST with dot trigger, the sub-populations
are easily separable by L2 norm at the learned representation level.
Tran et al. stated that correlation of images with the top Eigen vector
of the dataset can be considered a spectral property of the malicious
samples. This method of outlier detection is inspired from robust
statistics. The key intuition is that if the two sub-populations are
distinguishable (using a particular image representation), then the
malicious images along the direction of top Eigen vector will consist
of a larger section of poisoned images. Therefore, they will have a
different correlation than the genuine samples. For simple datasets
using small triggers (like described in Fig. 5), the sub-populations
are perfectly separable using correlation with top Eigen vector as
shown in Fig. 6(c).
B. Activation of different neurons
ABS [25] detects backdoored models whose malicious behavior is
successfully encoded with one neuron. In Fig. 7, we show that the
activation values peak for several neurons proving that our triggers
are actually encoded using more than one neuron. Therefore, ABS
would not be able detect our triggers.
C. Reversed triggers from Neural Cleanse
In this section, we report the reversed engineered triggers for the
backdoored models. Comparing the reversed triggers with Fig. 2,
we see stark differences between them.
FaceHack: Triggering backdoored facial recognition systems using facial characteristics XXXX ’XX, XXXX XX–XX, 1234, XXXX, XXX
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Backdoor analysis of MNIST triggers. (a) PCA of the datapoints considering the top two principle components at the
learned representation level. The red dots are the malicious images of the targetted class and the green dots are the genuine
images of the same class. (b) L2 norm of the genuine images (green) and malicious images (red) of the targetted label. (c)
Correlation of the genuine (green) and malicious (red) images of the targetted label.
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Figure 7: Activation analysis of different triggers for the neurons in the penultimate layer of the models. X-axis represents
different neurons in the penultimate layers and y-axis represents the activation values of those neurons. Triggers: (a) Natural
Smile (b) Arching of Eyebrows (c) Narrowing of eyes (d) Slightly opening of mouth (e) Young filter (f) Old filter (g) Smile filter
(h) Makeup filter.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 8: Neural cleanse defense analysis. Here we present the reversed triggers of ’smile’ when embedded artificially using
filters (a-c) and when embedded naturally using facial movements (d-f). (a) and (d) are the original images and (b) and (e) are
the reverse-engineered triggers. In (c) and (f) we super impose the reversed triggers with the original images. As depicted,
there is no visual similarity with the original triggers.
